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BACK TO THE FUTURE 
REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE 
REFORM. By David Bernstein.1 Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press. 2011. Pp. viii, 194. $45.00 (Cloth). 
William D. Araiza2 
“If you think Roe3 is right, why do you think Lochner4 is 
wrong?” 
Constitutional law professors love playing this card with 
students. We like to think it forces them to confront how their 
policy preferences influence their legal analysis. And it is a nice 
trick: Roe v. Wade5 responds to many (though not all6) students’ 
policy intuitions about the desirability of a broad abortion right, 
while Lochner v. New York7 is often taught as the paradigmatic 
anti-canonical case, a dark stain on the Supreme Court in the 
tradition of Dred Scott v. Sanford8 and Plessy v. Ferguson9 (the 
 
 1. Foundation Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. 
 2. Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. The reviewer wishes to acknowledge 
the financial support provided by the Brooklyn Law School Dean’s Summer Research 
Stipend Program. Thanks also to Sara Bernstein and Kristie LaSalle for fine research 
assistance. 
 3. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 4. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 5. Wade, 410 U.S. at 115. 
 6. Some studies suggest that young people may be less committed to abortion 
rights, or at least to the morality of abortion, than suggested by the standard story that 
holds that younger groups are inevitably more liberal on social issues. See, e.g., ROBERT 
P. JONES ET AL., COMMITTED TO AVAILABILITY, CONFLICTED ABOUT MORALITY: 
WHAT THE MILLENNIAL GENERATION TELLS US ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE 
ABORTION DEBATE AND THE CULTURE WARS, 8–10 (2011) available at http://www. 
publicreligion.org/research/?id=615 (polling data suggesting a “decoupling” of young 
people’s attitudes toward same-sex marriage and abortion).  
 7. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45. 
 8. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
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latter of which is sometimes paired with Lochner as the one-two 
punch of the evil Gilded Age Court). 
But not so fast. David Bernstein has done admirable work 
in debunking the melodramatic aspects of Lochner, and of the 
Lochner era more generally. His recent book, Rehabilitating 
Lochner: Defending Individual Rights Against Progressive 
Reform, while breaking little new analytical ground beyond his 
voluminous scholarship on the issue,10 recapitulates his 
impressive revisionist scholarship about Lochner and its 
eponymous era. His careful research makes clear that the 
Lochner era was not one in which a hopelessly reactionary Court 
in the service of the economic elite continually used woodenly 
formalistic reasoning to stymie needed social reform. Instead, he 
paints a much more balanced picture of the contending forces of 
the period.  
To begin with, Bernstein views the Court’s conservatives as 
sincerely concerned with individual liberty, both in terms of re-
sults and philosophy. For example, consider Meyer v. Nebraska, 
the 1923 case where the Court struck down a state law 
prohibiting the teaching of German.11 Bernstein notes that Meyer 
relied heavily on economic due process precedents, including 
Lochner itself. Thus, to the extent that modern substantive due 
process cases rely on Meyer,12 a fair case could be made that Roe 
was in fact the spawn of Lochner. He also observes that Meyer 
was authored by Justice McReynolds, whose notorious racism 
and anti-Semitism makes him, at least among the cognoscenti, 
probably the most unattractive villain of the pro-Lochner Four 
 
 9. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 10. See generally David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial 
Retrospective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1469 (2005) [hereinafter, Bernstein, Retrospective]; 
David E. Bernstein, Bolling, Equal Protection, Due Process, and Lochnerphobia, 93 
GEO. L.J. 1253 (2005) [hereinafter Bernstein, Bolling]; David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era 
Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 
92 GEO. L.J. 1 (2003) [hereinafter, Bernstein, Revisionism]; David E. Bernstein, 
Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2003); David E. Bernstein, Book Review: 
Lochner’s Feminist Legacy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1960 (2001) [hereinafter Bernstein, 
Feminist]; David E. Bernstein, Lochner, Parity, and the Chinese Laundry Cases, 41 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 211 (1999). 
 11. 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see also Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923) (companion 
case to Meyer). 
 12. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003) (citing Meyer but conclud-
ing that “the more pertinent beginning point” for the Court’s substantive due process 
analysis is Griswold); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); see also Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (citing Meyer but explaining it as a First 
Amendment case). 
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Horsemen.13 To gild the lily, one could add to Bernstein’s 
analysis the observation that McReynolds’ prose from the 
follow-on case to Meyer, Pierce v. Society of Sisters,14 especially 
his rejection of the state’s authority to “standardize” children,15 
bears for contemporary liberals an uncomfortable resemblance 
to Justice Brennan’s language in Michael H. v. Gerald D. about 
the protection due process affords to the freedom “not to 
conform.”16 
Contrast this picture of the conservative wing of the Court 
with the picture Bernstein paints of their Progressive opponents, 
on and off the Court. Rather than viewing them as heroic 
defenders of the downtrodden, Bernstein sees them as statists 
who would allow government a free hand to protect white, male, 
unionized labor at the expense of less favored workers, outlaw 
private (i.e., Catholic) education, and otherwise trample on 
individual liberties in the service of broader social goals. Indeed, 
Bernstein paints the Progressive cause in even darker terms: in 
Progressives’ views, less-capable workers are deemed unworthy 
of protection if minimum wage laws lead to their exclusion from 
the job market (pp. 53–54), women are intentionally excluded 
from that market (pp. 58, 62, 65, 66), and most menacingly, 
mental “defectives” are susceptible to the state’s power to 
sterilize them for the good of society (pp. 96–98). If Bernstein’s 
description of the conservatives can be summed up by 
McReynolds’s protection of parents’ liberty to avoid state 
“standardization” of their children, his description of the 
Progressives can be summed up by Holmes’ cruel aphorism in 
Buck v. Bell: “Three generations of imbeciles is enough.”17 
 
 13. He was also notoriously cruel to his law clerks. See, e.g., Barry Cushman, 
Clerking for Scrooge, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 721, 733–738 (2003); see also TODD PEPPERS, 
COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME 
COURT LAW CLERK 66–68 (2006). 
 14. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 15. Id. at 535 (“The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in 
this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by 
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.”). 
 16. 491 U.S. 110, 136, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 17. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1926). Indeed, the earlier parallel between 
Justice McReynolds’ language in Meyer and Justice Brennan’s language in Michael H., 
see text accompanying supra notes 14–16, finds a mirror image in the comparison 
between Justice Holmes and Justice Scalia: in Lochner, Holmes insisted that the Court 
not strike down laws as violating substantive due process unless the statute “would infringe 
fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and 
our law,” Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 55 (1905) (Holmes J, dissenting), language 
that would fit comfortably in a due process opinion written by Justice Scalia, see, e.g., 
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But the standard Lochner story may be invalid for a second 
reason as well, one that Bernstein does not accept. A second 
question raised by Lochner is whether Roe necessarily follows 
from it, or, by contrast, whether Roe and modern due process 
cases can be understood as having a different parentage. Under 
an alternative view to Bernstein’s, modern substantive due 
process owes (or should owe) at least as much to equality con-
cerns as to liberty.18 If this view is accepted, then the Lochner-
Roe connection is broken, or at least mitigated. In that case, 
maybe there is an answer to the law professor’s gotcha question. 
Maybe you can agree with Roe but disagree with Lochner. 
This Review follows, approximately, the structure of 
Bernstein’s book. Part I reviews the story of Lochner v. New 
York: its facts, the opinions and the question of its juris-
prudential foundation. Part II considers Lochner’s implications, 
both for what are now called “civil rights” or “civil liberties” and 
for minorities. Part III considers the modern implications of the 
absorption of many Lochner-based precedents into equal 
protection or equal protection-like categories19—in particular, 
what that absorption means for Lochner’s status as the father 
that modern substantive due process jurisprudence refuses to 
acknowledge.20 
I. THE LOCHNER CASE 
A. THE FACTS 
Bernstein’s description of Lochner does much to dispel the 
notion that the New York Bakeshop Law reflected a simple 
story of oppressed workers seeking legislative aid against 
 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 586, 593 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 18. See infra Part III. 
 19. By “equal protection-like” I mean in particular the content-neutrality rule in 
free speech and the requirement of discrimination in free exercise claims. The former in 
particular is noteworthy, as the content-neutrality rule derived from a case that was 
decided as an equal protection case. See Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 
(1972); see also Simon & Schuster v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims 
Compensation Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124, 125 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting this 
history, and tracing it to Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980)). 
 20. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973) (“We bear in mind, too, Mr. Justice 
Holmes’ admonition in his now-vindicated dissent in Lochner v. New York”); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481–482 (1965) (“Overtones of some arguments suggest that 
Lochner v. State of New York should be our guide. But we decline that invitation . . .” 
(citation omitted)). 
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powerful capitalists. Bernstein argues that, as is sometimes the 
case with regulatory legislation, the powerful sectors of the 
relevant industry supported the law, with an eye to restricting 
the competition posed by newer, smaller entrants into the 
market. In this case, Bernstein argues that the large bakeries 
supporting the law already satisfied its sanitary rules and 
maximum working-hours provisions, and thus had little to fear 
from it (p. 27). Conversely, Bernstein argues that the forces 
opposed to the law were small bakeshops, in particular those 
owned by recent Jewish, Italian and French immigrants (p. 24). 
In setting up the conflict this way, Bernstein returns to a 
theme that he has expressed before: that ostensibly pro-labor 
regulatory legislation, such as laws permitting or even requiring 
closed-shop arrangements, are often really attempts by 
entrenched groups to secure benefits for themselves by limiting 
the operation of the free market.21 Bernstein has made this point 
when arguing that pro-union legislation harmed African-
Americans who were shut out of those unions because of racism, 
and thus were shut out of economic opportunities when 
legislation benefitted union members at the expense of non-
union workers. In Rehabilitating Lochner he suggests similar 
effects, if not similar malicious motivation, with regard to laws 
regulating the terms of work performed by women (pp. 58, 62, 
65, 66).22 The heroic picture of Progressive legislatures protecting 
oppressed workers from rapacious capitalists becomes instead an 
anti-heroic one where powerful interests groups (now including 
unions) band together to preserve their monopoly privileges 
against the striving of less powerful underclass groups. 
But problems lurk within this story, even as Bernstein tells 
it. First, a single piece of legislation may have many different 
effects, some nefarious and others quite benign. For example, 
Bernstein cites bakery owners who supported the law in part 
 
 21. See DAVID BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE FOR REDRESS: AFRICAN 
AMERICANS, LABOR REGULATIONS AND THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO 
THE NEW DEAL 111–18 (2001) [hereinafter, BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE]. 
 22. See also Bernstein, Feminist, supra note 10, at 1971 (describing the view of 
“some reformers” during the Lochner era that that “saw women workers as an obstacle 
to their goal of persuading society that employers should be required to pay male heads 
of households a wage sufficient to support their families” and writing that “[t]he National 
Consumers’ League opposed . . . any . . . reform that might tempt women to enter the 
workforce”); id. at 1985 (“[P]rotective [labor] legislation was often promoted by labor 
unions that excluded women to prevent them from competing for jobs held or sought by 
union members”). 
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because they hoped its sanitary provisions would improve the 
reputation of bakeries, thus leading consumers to patronize 
them rather than baking their own bread (p. 27). Presumably, 
government has a legitimate interest in increasing the public’s 
confidence in an industry-based food distribution network, apart 
from either any discriminatory effects the law might have or any 
restrictions on liberty of contract it might impose. Concededly, 
this justification does not mitigate the law’s impact on equality 
or liberty rights. But it does blur the previously-clear picture of 
the bakeshop law as purely special interest legislation, unless 
legislative encouragement of industrial growth is itself special 
interest legislation.23 
Second, the underlying facts justifying legislation are often 
hard to discern conclusively. Bernstein’s own research reveals 
this. He notes that, in the run-up to the bakeshop law, New York 
had been roiled by accounts of unsanitary conditions in bake-
shops. In particular, he recounts the story of a “dying Jewish 
baker . . . carried from a cellar bakery on the Lower East Side” 
in 1894 (p. 25). Based on that event, the bakery union chief 
convinced a newspaper to run a series of muckraking articles 
investigating and exposing conditions in bakeshops. But 
Bernstein expresses some doubt about the accuracy of the 
reporting, based on the reporter’s sympathies and the timing of 
the article. He also cites two government reports that came to 
contradictory conclusions about the veracity of the reporter’s 
conclusions (p. 25). 
How is a legislature to know which facts most closely 
approximate reality? More relevantly, how is a court to know? 
The difficulty courts have in discerning both legislative 
motivations and underlying policy facts has led, in the modern 
 
 23. If such motivations are illegitimate, then presumably broad swaths of the 
common law designed to further entrepreneurship and risk-taking would be similarly 
problematic. See, e.g., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 11-56 (“The decision [in Hadley v. 
Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex.) 151 (1854) (limiting damages available for breach of 
contract to those that are foreseeable or avoidable)] was clearly based on the policy of 
protecting enterprises in the then-burgeoning industrial revolution); Joseph M. Perillo, 
Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach and Tortious Interference, 68 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1096 (2000) (writing, in the context of a discussion of Hadley, 
that “the rule of certainty, like the rule of foreseeability, encourages entrepreneurial risk 
taking”); Jan Gordon Laitos, Continuities From the Past Affecting Resource Use and 
Conservation Patterns, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 60, 83 (1975) (“The central concept of tort 
liability [in the nineteenth century] reflected society’s favor for production . . . By 
reducing legal risks through the liability concept, tort law tended to encourage 
entrepreneurs to venture for productive ends.”). 
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era, to the extreme deference courts exhibit when considering 
claims of infringements of non-fundamental rights and 
discrimination against non-suspect classes. Of course, Bernstein 
is an academic, not a legislator or a judge; based on his historical 
investigation he might be able to draw more confident 
conclusions about these issues. But even he is forced to 
introduce some ambiguity into his narrative. For example, as 
noted above he cites two different government studies that 
reached different conclusions about the health risks of 
bakeshops. 
It is probably the case that both public health and anti-
newcomer sentiment motivated the New York legislature, just as 
it is probably the case that the law both advanced public health 
and disparately impacted newcomers. How great were those 
effects and what was the legislature’s predominant motivation 
(even assuming legislative motivation is relevant)?24 The 
difficulty in answering those questions makes judicial review—
like that in Lochner—difficult. In turn, this difficulty counsels in 
favor of either narrowing the set of situations where courts will 
perform careful review, or abandoning the careful review 
Lochner exhibited in favor of more deferential judicial scrutiny. 
But Lochner, by insisting on at least some degree of real judicial 
review every time a regulation impaired one’s ability to act in 
 
 24. Bernstein argues that the Court during this period did not inquire into 
underlying legislative purpose (p. 15). While there is language in the caselaw supporting 
this conclusion, commentators have sometimes described opinions during this period as 
turning on considerations of congressional motive. See, e.g., Rosiland Dixon, Partial 
Constitutional Amendments, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 643, 663 (2011) (suggesting that the 
Court considered congressional motive in the child labor cases, Hammer v. Dagenhart, 
247 U.S. 251 (1918), and Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922), where the 
Court rejected, respectively, federal bans on interstate shipment and taxation of child 
labor-manufactured goods as illegitimate attempts by Congress to regulate manu-
facturing). Ultimately, the distinction here may turn on whether the term “motive” 
implies some level of subjective motivation or a “purpose” abstracted out from the 
necessary effect of the law at issue. See, e.g., Bailey, 259 U.S. at 38 (“Although Congress 
[in the ostensible tax it levied on child labor-manufactured items] does not invalidate the 
contract of employment or expressly declare that the employment within the mentioned 
ages is illegal, it does exhibit its intent practically to achieve the latter result by adopting 
the criteria of wrongdoing and imposing its principal consequence on those who 
transgress its standard.”); see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (“It is 
impossible to shut our eyes to the fact that many of the laws of this character, while 
passed under what is claimed to be the police power . . . are, in reality, passed from other 
motives. We are justified in saying so when, from the character of the law and the subject 
upon which it legislates, it is apparent that the public health or welfare bears but the most 
remote relation to the law. The purpose of a statute must be determined from the natural 
and legal effect of the language employed . . . .”). 
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the marketplace, opened up the specter of judicial review of 
every instance of what we now call “economic and social 
regulation.”25 
B. A LACK OF DEFERENCE? 
Lochner’s insistence on more than pro forma judicial review 
in every case of contractual liberty requires an examination of 
the deference with which the Court acted. Justice Peckham’s 
opinion for the Court has been roundly criticized for its failure 
to defer to the legislature’s determinations. Such deference 
could take one of two, or possibly three, forms. First, it could 
take the form of Justice Holmes’s presumption that such 
legislation was constitutional, given his understanding that the 
Due Process Clause simply did not protect substantive rights 
such as the right to contract. In a sense, the Holmes approach is 
not deference at all, as it reflects a bright-line rule that the 
Constitution simply does not speak to the claim at issue. 
A second approach, one that is deferential in the true sense 
of the word, is reflected by the modern rational basis standard 
used to decide cases where non-fundamental rights are alleged 
to be unconstitutionally infringed. This approach, while similarly 
yielding predictable government wins, at least leaves open the 
theoretical possibility that a law could be so arbitrary that it 
violates the substantive guarantee of liberty found in the Due 
Process Clause. Finally, a third approach, the one associated 
with Justice Harlan’s Lochner dissent, defers to government 
determinations that the public interest requires an infringement 
on liberty, but does so only after something more than 
perfunctory judicial review. 
Did Justice Peckham really refuse to defer? His opinion for 
the Court reads at times like a breezy rejection of the 
legislature’s findings: he relied on “the common understanding” 
that “the trade of a baker has never been understood as an 
unhealthy one,”26 and then complained that upholding the New 
York law would render susceptible to state regulation every 
profession, since, “unfortunately . . . labor, even in any depart-
ment [sic], may possibly carry with it the seeds of 
unhealthiness.”27 On the other hand, he also wrote that he 
 
 25. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766 (1977) (using this term). 
 26. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59. 
 27. Id. 
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reached his conclusion about the health risk of being a baker “in 
looking through statistics regarding all trades and occupations.”28 
Indeed, Bernstein elsewhere argues that Peckham “clearly relied 
on—but, to the detriment of his reputation, did not explicitly 
cite—the studies discussed in the appendix to Lochner’s brief 
showing bakers had similar mortality rates to many ordinary 
professions that the legislature did not regulate.”29 But even had 
Peckham explicitly cited those studies he still would have been 
susceptible to the criticism that he was choosing for himself 
which studies to rely on and which to discredit. By contrast, 
Harlan explicitly cited studies that supported the view that 
baking was unhealthful work.30 Based on that evidence, he 
concluded that the law was not “beyond all question a plain, 
palpable invasion of rights secured by” the Constitution.31 The 
charge of failure to defer appears solid. 
More generally, Bernstein’s careful analysis of the differing 
deference levels in the various Lochner opinions helpfully 
illuminates two distinct disagreements on the Court. One, 
between Holmes and the eight Justices comprising the Peckham 
majority and the Harlan dissent, centered on the existence of an 
unenumerated right to contract, and, indeed, on whether the 
Due Process Clause protected any substantive rights whatsoever. 
The other faultline exposed by Lochner concerned the amount 
of deference legislatures were due when they regulated in ways 
that impaired contractual liberty. Both of these divisions were 
moving targets: by 1925, Justice Holmes was willing to recognize, 
based on the Court’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause in 
other contexts, that the Clause provided at least some protection 
for the freedom of speech.32 Similarly, Bernstein notes that in the 
second decade of the twentieth century the Court became 
significantly friendlier to government regulation, but then 
 
 28. Id.  
 29. See Bernstein, Retrospective, supra note 10, at 1498. 
 30. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 71 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Bernstein elsewhere notes 
that the studies Harlan cited did not appear in New York’s brief. Bernstein, 
Retrospective, supra note 10, at 1499. 
 31. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 68 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 32. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The 
general principle of free speech, it seems to me, must be taken to be included in the 
Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope that has been given to the word ‘liberty’ as 
there used. . . .”); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) (recognizing, based on precedent, that the Due Process Clause provided 
substantive guarantees that included the First Amendment right to freedom of speech). 
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increased its scrutiny again with the ascension of several Harding 
appointees (pp. 48–49). 
Here again Bernstein performs a useful service by per-
forming a more fine-grained analysis of the Lochner Court. In 
particular, by considering Harlan’s dissent he does much to 
dispel the black-and-white narrative that too often passes as the 
truth about Lochner. However, his carefulness in delineating the 
different phases of the Lochner era has the ironic effect of 
watering down the force of his argument about the Court’s mode 
of analysis during this period, and the implications of its 
approach. Simply put, it is harder to paint a coherent picture of 
how much the Court deferred to legislative judgments (and thus 
how strictly it protected the right to contract), and how its 
approach impacted minorities and other outsiders, given the 
Court’s evolution from its early-phase stringent review to its 
middle-phase (relatively) lenient review, and then back again.33 
Obviously, it’s not Bernstein’s fault that the Court didn’t 
apply a consistent analytical approach during this period, even if 
that ambiguity does muddy his underlying narrative. More 
importantly for our purposes, the question of how much the 
Lochner-era Court really deferred to marketplace regulation 
becomes less important once the economic regulation cases 
provided the foundation for the Court’s non-economic liberty 
jurisprudence. To the extent the marketplace cases generated 
Meyer and its progeny, the impact of that generative process 
persisted, even if the stringency of the Court’s underlying 
economic due process analysis waxed and waned. 
C. LIBERTY OR EQUALITY? 
In Rehabilitating Lochner, Bernstein makes a powerful 
argument that Lochner was based on liberty rather than equality 
concerns. To many ears this may sound obvious. However, 
Bernstein rightly chooses to spend time addressing the argu-
ment, most fully developed by Michael Les Benedict and 
Howard Gillman, that Lochner-era jurisprudence focused less on 
protecting individual liberty than on ensuring that government 
not enact so-called “class legislation.”34 Anxiety about class 
 
 33. Indeed, Bernstein speculates that Lochner itself included statements that not all 
members of the five-Justice majority agreed with (pp. 34–35). Thus, even the case itself 
arguably stands for less than what it appears to at face value. 
 34. See generally Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation 
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legislation—that is, legislation that bestowed benefits and 
burdens unequally, and in particular legislation that granted 
monopoly privileges—was surely a major concern of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Bernstein acknowledges that avoid-
ance of class legislation was a major concern of the original 
framers (who expressed it as a concern about faction),35 ante-
bellum constitutional thinkers and the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment (pp. 14–15).36 But in his other writing, Bernstein 
argues that the class legislation prohibition was never inter-
preted stringently by the Supreme Court.37 Indeed, he contrasts 
the Supreme Court with some state high courts, which he argues 
enforced equality guarantees strictly.38 
It is difficult in a short review to evaluate which side has the 
better of the debate, in large part because, as Bernstein himself 
notes, class legislation restrictions constituted part of the Court’s 
understanding of due process. This should not be surprising: our 
current practice of rigidly separating substantive rights, protect-
ed under due process, from equality rights, protected under 
equal protection, was likely alien to the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s drafters, or at least not their primary under-
standing.39 For confirmation, one need only look to the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, which protected not a particular level of 
contract and property rights, but the same level of protection as 
that a state granted white citizens.40  
For our purposes, it is unnecessary to resolve this dispute. 
Regardless of Lochner’s basis, the fact remains that the Meyer 
line of cases began to diverge from any explicit concern with 
 
of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 L. & HIST. REV. 293 
(1985); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE 
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993). 
 35. See, e.g., GILLMAN, supra note 34, at 22 (“[t]he distinctions Lochner era judges 
attempted to draw between valid public-purpose legislation . . . and invalid class 
legislation . . . had their origins in a similar set of distinctions elaborated by the framers of 
the Constitution”). 
 36. Mark G. Yudof, Equal Protection, Class Legislation and Sex Discrimination: 
One Small Cheer for Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1366, 1373–
74 (1990); see also Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation and 
Colorblindedness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 245, 251–68 (1997). 
 37. See Bernstein, Revisionism, supra note 10, at 15–21; Bernstein, Feminist, supra 
note 10, at 1963. 
 38. See Bernstein, Revisionism, supra note 10, at 18–20. 
 39. A vestige of this understanding may remain today in the fundamental rights 
strand of equal protection. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 40. See, e.g., Jacobus tenBroek, Equal Under Law 237 (1965) (concluding that the 
Equal Protection Clause required full—that is, substantive—protection for these rights). 
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class legislation or equality. Certainly these cases can be 
understood as dealing with unequal or discriminatory legislation. 
Indeed, that fact may allow their legitimate reconceptualization 
as cases about discrimination.41 But language about class 
legislation is largely absent from the actual opinions. Thus, one 
can remain agnostic about the liberty vs. class legislation debate 
in Lochner while still recognizing that, somehow, Lochner’s 
progeny became based on substantive liberty rather than on the 
requirement that all legislation be general. 
II. LOCHNER’S IMPLICATIONS 
The middle chapters of Rehabilitating Lochner—Chapters 4 
and 5, and to a great degree Chapter 6—consider Lochner’s 
implications for, respectively, sex equality, racial equality, and 
what we now call “civil rights” or “civil liberties.” Bernstein 
makes important claims in these chapters, which are all the more 
significant because they challenge the standard view that 
Lochner-era jurisprudence inevitably favored powerful interests 
at the expense of the powerless. These claims deserve a closer 
look. 
A. CIVIL LIBERTIES AND LOCHNER 
What did Lochner mean for the rights we today call “civil 
rights” or “civil liberties?” Bernstein is persuasive in arguing 
that Lochner was the doctrinal font for the Court’s gradual 
embrace of such rights in the 1920’s and 1930’s. He notes that 
Justice McReynolds’s opinion in Meyer v. Nebraska42 relied 
heavily on economic due process cases as support for the 
proposition that the Due Process Clause protects a parent’s right 
to direct his child’s upbringing.43 More generally, Lochner-era 
Justices favoring the right to contract also played important roles 
in expanding civil liberties. For example, Justice McReynolds, in 
 
 41. See infra Part II(A). 
 42. 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see also Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923) (companion 
case to Meyer). 
 43. Later opinions upholding constitutional rights claims did not rely as heavily on 
economic due process as the foundation. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-67 
(1932) (relying on history and general statements in early cases about the possibility that 
“due process” included specific Bill of Rights guarantees to incorporate the Sixth 
Amendment); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (assuming, without deciding 
or giving extended discussion, that due process liberty included the freedom of speech). 
But see 268 U.S. at 666 n.9 (citing, among other cases, the statement in Coppage v. 
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915), that liberty and property are “human rights”). 
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writing Meyer, used expansive language about the scope of 
individual liberty,44 while Justice Sutherland wrote important 
civil liberties opinions in the criminal procedure45 and press 
freedom46 areas. Conversely, Justices Holmes and Brandeis were, 
at best, reluctant converts to the cause of substantive due 
process liberty.47 
So it seems like an open and shut case that Lochner is the 
font of the Court’s first protections of civil liberties, and thus of 
the Court’s modern individual rights jurisprudence. But the 
picture is at least slightly more complicated. As Bernstein 
himself has noted in his previous scholarship on the Lochner era, 
many of those early civil rights cases dealt with government 
action that had severe disparate impacts on minorities. The 
statute struck down in Meyer was the product of anti-German 
xenophobia during the World War I era,48 while the law at issue 
in Pierce v. Society of Sisters clearly aimed at Catholic 
education,49 the hangover from the bitter nineteenth century 
disputes between Protestants seeking to inculcate their religious 
values via public education and Catholics seeking to preserve 
 
 44. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (“While this court has not attempted to define with 
exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and 
some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not 
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to 
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, 
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his 
own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law 
as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”). 
 45. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Powell was the case dealing with 
“the Scottsboro Boys,” African-American young men who were victimized by a racist 
criminal justice system in the South. 
 46. See Am. Press v. Grosjean, 297 U.S. 233 (1936); ARTHUR HELLMAN, WILLIAM 
ARAIZA AND THOMAS BAKER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND 
RELIGION 820 (2nd ed. 2010) (noting Sutherland’s position). 
 47. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring) (“Despite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me persuasive, it is 
settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of 
substantive law as well as to matters of procedure.”); Gitlow, 258 U.S. at 671 (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (“The general principle of free speech, it seems to me, must be taken to be 
included in the Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope that has been given to the 
word ‘liberty’ as there used”); see also p. 101 (describing Holmes’ recognition that due 
process protects the freedom of speech as “grudging”).  
 48. See Bernstein, Bolling, supra note 10, at 1273 (“The Meyer law had been 
motivated by nativist hysteria attendant to World War I.”). 
 49. See Bernstein, Bolling, supra note 10, at 1274 (describing the law struck down in 
Pierce as “inspired by anti-Catholic sentiment”). For an alternative view, see Steven J. 
Macias, The Huck Finn Syndrome in History and Theory: The Origins of Family Privacy, 
12 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 87, 105–09 (2010) (arguing that the Oregon referendum leading to 
the law struck down in Pierce was not heavily motivated by anti-Catholic animus). 
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their values via parochial education.50 The major speech cases of 
the era all dealt (as they usually do) with the speech of 
dissenters, usually unpopular ones at that.51 For their part the 
criminal procedure cases dealt with criminal defendants, hardly 
the most popular group in any polity. This fact was especially 
true during this era, as the key cases that began using the Due 
Process Clause to incorporate the Bill of Rights’ criminal 
procedure provisions dealt with racist southern criminal justice 
systems and African-American defendants.52 
Indeed, as Bernstein briefly notes (p. 104), the Court in the 
famous footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products53 
transformed Meyer, Pierce and similar cases54 into cases that 
stood for the proposition that “similar considerations [requiring 
more stringent judicial review than normal] enter into the review 
of statutes directed at particular religious or national or racial 
minorities.”55 Bernstein is more than grudging here: referring to 
footnote four’s treatment of the Meyer line of cases, he writes as 
follows: “The Court creatively reinterpreted—that is, inten-
tionally misinterpreted—Meyer and Pierce as decisions 
invalidating laws because the laws discriminated against 
minorities” (p. 104). 
 
 50. See, e.g., Meir Katz, The Economics of Section 170: A Case for the Charitable 
Deduction of Parochial School Tuition, 12 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 224, 259 n.134 
(2011) (noting this phenomenon in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries); 
Christopher C. Lund, The New Victims of the Old-Anti-Catholicism 4–7, 10–11 (Wayne 
State University Law School Working Paper No. 10-13), available at http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=1943646 (same); see also id. at n.1 (citing sources); Bernstein, Bolling, 
supra note 10, at 1274 (discussing Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927), a case 
dealing with a Hawaii law restricting foreign-language education, which Bernstein 
describes as “designed to shut down Japanese-language schools in Hawaii”). 
 51. E.g., Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 252 (considering a free speech challenge to a New York 
law aimed at agitation in favor of the overthrow of private property); Herndon v. 
Lowery, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (finding First Amendment protection for Communist 
literature calling for a separate state for African Americans living in the South). 
 52. E.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (“Scottsboro Boys” case). Note, 
however, that pro-Lochner Justices Butler and McReynolds dissented in Powell, albeit 
on a narrow ground. See Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling the Sixth Amendment, 11 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 487, 492 n.18 (2009) (citing cases); Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling 
Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 764 (1991) (“The vast 
majority of the Court’s first constitutional interventions in state criminal procedure 
involved the Jim Crow ‘justice’ southern states meted out to black defendants.”). 
 53. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 54. See id. (citing Meyer, Pierce, and also Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923), the 
companion case to Meyer, and Farrington, which dealt with a similar restriction on 
foreign-language schools in the very different context of Hawaii, where the Court, relying 
on Meyer, Pierce and Bartels, struck down the law). 
 55. Id. 
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The stridency of Bernstein’s criticism seems a little unfair. 
Bernstein does not develop the argument in Rehabilitating 
Lochner, but in other scholarship he has argued that the Meyer 
line of cases and others (most notably Adkins v. Children’s 
Hospital56 and Buchanan v. Warley57) are based on an approach 
in which, once a court identifies a protected liberty interest that 
the law infringes, discriminatory motives or goals are insufficient 
to provide a police power justification for the infringement.58 
Thus, his argument with regard to footnote four’s treatment of 
Meyer seems to be that footnote four focused on the fact of 
discrimination, rather than on the insufficiency of discriminatory 
motives as justification for an infringement on liberty rights. 
In theory this is a real distinction. Under Bernstein’s 
understanding of how the Lochner-era Court analyzed cases like 
Meyer, a crucial first step was the identification of a liberty right. 
If no liberty right was at stake, that was the end of the case—the 
government won. But if such a liberty right did exist, the 
government could not justify its infringement by claiming a 
discriminatory motive.59 By contrast, under footnote four’s 
formula, discrimination against a “discrete and insular” minority 
triggered closer judicial scrutiny. Not only was there not any 
preliminary inquiry into the existence of a liberty interest, but 
the entire focus of the analysis moved away from the 
government’s police power-based reasons for infringing on a 
liberty interest and toward to the government’s justifications for 
the discrimination itself. In sum, the focus shifts from liberty 
interests to anti-discrimination simpliciter. 
But this distinction may be more theoretical than real, at 
least if due process is to do the work Bernstein thinks it should. 
Consider Bolling v. Sharpe,60 the companion case to Brown v. 
 
 56. 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down a District of Columbia ordinance mandating 
a minimum wage for women). 
 57. 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (striking down a Louisville, Kentucky, ordinance prohibiting 
real estate sales that would lead to residential integration). 
 58. See Bernstein, Bolling, supra note 10, at 1270–73. 
 59. See, e.g., Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 80–82 (noting, and rejecting, the city’s race-
based reasons for the ordinance); Adkins, 261 U.S. at 552–53 (noting, and rejecting, the 
government’s arguments about women’s incapacity to contract as justifications for the 
law); see also Bernstein, Bolling, supra note 10, at 1272 (“In Buchanan the Court held 
that denial of property rights for African Americans could not be based on weak race-
related police power rationales. In Adkins, the Court held that women could not be 
denied liberty of contract based solely on weak gender-related police power 
rationales.”). 
 60. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
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Board of Education,61 in which the Court struck down school 
segregation in District of Columbia schools. As Bernstein has 
elsewhere argued,62 Bolling is a confused opinion. The absence 
of an Equal Protection Clause binding the federal government 
required the Court to rely on the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause. While that Clause had long been understood as 
including some restriction on discrimination,63 Bolling’s reliance 
on due process inevitably raised the specter of resurrecting 
Lochner-era jurisprudence, especially given how the Lochner-
era Court had combined concepts of liberty and equality. 
Bernstein has argued that Bolling would have been a more 
coherent opinion had the Court forthrightly relied on the Meyer 
line of cases to recognize a liberty to attend a non-segregated 
public school, and then, following Lochner-era analysis, had 
rejected racially discriminatory justifications for the law.64 But 
this approach requires recognizing a liberty interest in attending 
a non-segregated public school. That move seems to be a stretch. 
As Bernstein himself notes, it is susceptible to the objection that 
“once a Lochnerian Court acknowledged that access to a 
government-provided service could be construed as a liberty 
right, the entire classical/libertarian edifice of Lochner would be 
lost.”65 His response—that “a libertarian might argue that to 
subsidize one group is the economic equivalent of taxing its 
competitors”—and thus that “[t]o subsidize whites’ education 
more than blacks’ education . . . is, by economists’ lights, the 
equivalent of taxing blacks more than whites”66 seems, at least at 
first glance, to erase any boundaries on what we call liberty 
rights. If discriminatory access to public education violates the 
victim’s liberty, then presumably so does discriminatory access 
to a government contract67 or broadcasting license,68 or 
discriminatory access to any government service at all.69 If 
 
 61. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 62. See generally Bernstein, Bolling, supra note 10. 
 63. See generally id. 
 64. See, e.g., id. at 1282. 
 65. Id. at 1283 (emphasis in original). 
 66. Id. 
 67. E.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 68. E.g., Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). 
 69. E.g., Kotch v. Bd. of Riverboat Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947) (govern-
ment appointment as riverboat pilot); Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) 
(discriminatory access to a city water hookup). 
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anything becomes a liberty interest, then searching for a liberty 
interest becomes a purely formalistic exercise.70 
The upshot is that if Bernstein is going to argue that the 
Bolling Court could have reached the same result via the 
standard Lochner-style approach to discriminatory deprivations 
of liberty, then presumably most, if not all, modern equal 
protection fact patterns can be understood in this way as well. 
Perhaps more to the point, if one is willing to expand the notion 
of liberty as Bernstein is in his discussion of Bolling, then the 
Lochner Court’s own precedents—Meyer, Pierce, Farrington, 
Buchanan and Adkins—can be legitimately understood as cases 
focusing on the discrimination, not on the liberty interest. 
Hence my suggestion that Bernstein is perhaps too harsh in 
his evaluation of Carolene Products’s reconceptualization of the 
Lochner-era civil rights cases. In addition to the analysis 
sketched out above, the rhetoric of those cases rests easily within 
a basic concern for equality, separate from the status of the 
regulated conduct as a liberty interest. For example, Adkins’ 
concern for the equal dignity of women fits easily within modern 
equal protection doctrine’s aspiration to eradicate stereotypes 
about women’s capabilities while recognizing government’s 
legitimate authority to compensate women for past discrimin-
ation and account for real differences between the sexes.71 
Similarly, Justice McReynolds’ refusal in Pierce to allow the 
government to “standardize” its children72 can be reasonably 
 
 70. It is true enough that there remains a distinction between the Lochner Court’s 
second step—considering the police power justifications for the law—and modern equal 
protection doctrine’s approach of considering the government interests behind the 
challenged classification. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (testing the state’s 
gender-based classification against its highway-safety justifications). But this may be a 
distinction without a difference. The type of police power argument that government 
may have made, say, in Adkins—that women are incapable of contracting as effectively 
as men, and thus need the government’s assistance—closely tracks the type of argument 
a modern government-defendant would make when defending a classification against an 
equal protection challenge. For example, a modern government-defendant defending a 
law classifying based on gender might well argue that women are truly different from 
men, and merit different treatment. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) 
(accepting this type of argument). Of course, there still has to be some positive 
justification for the law, rather than simply a claim that the two groups are similarly 
situated. This is simply a restatement of the fundamental rule that every law must have a 
justification. But if Bernstein is correct that the Lochner-era Court gave legislatures 
broad latitude to legislate for the public good, then the deference with which the modern 
Court applies this rule would not differ greatly from how the Lochner Court would apply 
the analogous rule that a law must be within the government’s police power. 
 71. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 547 (1996). 
 72. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
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read as reflecting a concern about dissenting or minority 
approaches to basic issues such as child-rearing and family 
structure.73  
Such a reconceptualization would not make the Pierce line 
of cases incoherent or anomalous. For example, approximately 
sixty years after Meyer, Justice Brennan in Michael H. v. Gerald 
D.—another due process case—spoke of the freedom “not to 
conform.”74 Tellingly, such freedoms have also been vindicated 
via the Equal Protection Clause.75 And approximately sixty years 
before Meyer, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 guaranteed to all 
individuals the “same rights” to contractual and other liberties,76 
an equality right whose constitutionalization all agree was at 
least one of the major goals of the Fourteenth Amendment.77 
Indeed, even during the Lochner era the Court was already 
experimenting with this reconceptualization. For example, in 
Nixon v. Herndon,78 seemingly an equal protection case,79 the 
Court cited Buchanan as an example of invidious race 
discrimination, without any mention of the liberty interest 
Buchanan originally focused on.80 
 
 73. This concern can work its way through the doctrine either via due process, as 
with Pierce and Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (considering a challenge to 
a California law conclusively presuming paternity to the husband of a woman bearing a 
child), or equal protection, as with Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 
(1973) (striking down, as violating equal protection, a law that denied food stamp 
benefits to members of unrelated communal homes). See also City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 455 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(agreeing that a city’s denial of a zoning exemption to a group seeking to establish a 
group home for mentally retarded persons violated equal protection, but arguing that the 
level of scrutiny to be accorded the government action should depend in part on the fact 
that the action infringed on the right to establish a residence in a given area). See also 
supra note 39. 
 74. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 140 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also text 
accompanying supra note 16 (repeating this parallel). 
 75. See supra note 73. 
 76. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31 § 1, 14 Stat. 27. 
 77. E.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 26–27 (2d ed. 1997); 
WILLIAM NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO 
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 104 (1988); TENBROEK, supra note 40 at 224–25. 
 78. 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (striking down a Texas law authorizing state political parties 
to exclude whoever they wished from primary voting, as violating the Fourteenth 
Amendment when applied by the state Democratic Party to exclude African-
Americans). 
 79. See id. at 89 (“The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted as it was with special 
solicitude for the equal protection of members of the Negro race, lays a duty upon the 
court to level by its judgment these barriers of color.”). 
 80. See id. at 89 (“Delegates of the State’s power have discharged their official 
functions in such a way as to discriminate invidiously between white citizens and black. 
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 77 [(1917)]. The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted as 
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Thus, it is not self-evident that Justice Stone’s “creative[] 
misinterpret[ation]” of the Meyer line of cases was illegitimate, 
as suggested by Bernstein’s dismissal of that move. Creative, 
yes—even aggressive. Bernstein is right that the Lochner-era 
civil rights opinions were doctrinally focused on due process. But 
the fact that due process doctrine rejected discrimination as a 
legitimate police power objective means that equality considera-
tions would enter into the Court’s analysis, at least in cases that 
were ripe for recasting in footnote four as equal protection cases. 
This recasting is not necessarily illegitimate, if by 1938 the Court 
had come to realize that the Meyer line of cases, the Court’s 
then-nascent protection for speech, association and voting rights, 
and indeed, the protection of all Bill of Rights provisions it 
decided to incorporate, were correct exactly because they pre-
sented appropriately-cabined situations where more intrusive 
judicial review was called for, while avoiding such review every 
time government regulated the marketplace.81 
Bernstein is also correct when he states, immediately after 
the “intentionally misinterpreted” sentence above,82 that foot-
note four “was the Court’s first of several attempts to preserve 
[the Meyer] line of cases by disentangling them from their roots 
in the now-obsolete liberty of contract line of cases” (p. 104). 
But by itself that does not prove that the Court’s action was 
illegitimate. It is not unknown for the Court to “disentangle” 
holdings it deems correct from an underlying context or 
foundation it finds problematic.83 Concededly, such attempts are 
potentially problematic, exactly because they provoke the 
response that the Court is simply picking the results it wants to 
preserve and pruning away the context of surrounding 
undesirable results in an unprincipled way.84 But given the 
 
it was with special solicitude for the equal protection of members of the Negro race, lays 
a duty upon the court to level by its judgment these barriers of color.” (parallel and 
additional citations omitted)). 
 81. As implied by Carolene Products, such careful review is justified in these 
situations because of either the likelihood of a political process breakdown or, in the case 
of specific Bill of Rights provisions, the greater legitimacy of judicial enforcement of 
specifically-worded constraints on government action. See United States v. Carolene 
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 82. See supra text accompanying note 53. 
 83. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 853 (arguing that it is 
preserving the “central holding” of Roe while correcting other doctrinal mistakes Roe 
made). 
 84. See, e.g., id. at 979, 993 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) (making a similar objection to the joint opinion’s treatment of Roe). 
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foundation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers’ concern 
with both liberty and equality, not to mention later justices’ 
attempts to determine the scope of due process rights by 
recourse to equality concerns,85 Stone’s reconceptualization of 
these cases deserves at least more study than the quick dismissal 
Bernstein provides. 
Regardless of one’s views about this question, the point 
remains that Lochner did ultimately make footnote four 
possible, by paving the way for cases like Meyer and in turn their 
eventual reconceptualization as equality cases. This insight raises 
a further, more practical question about Lochner and minorities: 
how good was Lochner itself for the minorities that its progeny 
eventually were understood to protect? 
B. LOCHNER AND MINORITIES 
Bernstein argues forcefully that Lochner, and the muscular 
protection of substantive due process rights it represents, was 
good for minorities. As explained above, he draws a clear line 
connecting Lochner, the Meyer line of cases and the Court’s 
ultimate protection of free expression and criminal procedure 
rights. His argument is hard to refute: even if, as suggested above, 
the non-economic due process cases can legitimately be recon-
ceptualized as cases about discrimination, the fact remains that 
the opinions themselves relied on Lochner and its progeny. In 
this way, Bernstein is right to conclude that Lochner eventually 
redounded to the significant benefit of minorities. 
However, Bernstein pushes the argument further. First, he 
argues that economic due process itself helped minorities by 
providing a means for courts to strike down discriminatory 
government action that impeded the core Lochner right to 
contract. In Rehabilitating Lochner, Bernstein presses the point 
that Lochner, by leading to the striking down of the Louisville, 
Kentucky, residential segregation ordinance in Buchanan v. 
Warley,86 provided an important tool for African-Americans to 
gain a residential and thus social foothold in major cities. 
 
 85. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 140 (1989) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that due process protects the “freedom not to conform”); Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (noting that a holding about the due process right of 
gays and lesbians to engage in consensual non-commercial sexual intimacy also furthers 
equal protection values). 
 86. 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
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This is a provocative claim. To his credit, Bernstein does not 
over-argue it. Thus, he writes: 
Giving Buchanan its due does not absolve the Supreme Court 
of its acquiescence to Jim Crow in other contexts. Nor does it 
remotely suggest that the pre-New Deal Court’s civil rights 
jurisprudence was superior to that of later Supreme Courts 
which, like American society more generally, became 
increasingly egalitarian on race. But, given that advocates of 
racial equality were a distinct minority among Progressives, 
the practical alternative to the early twentieth century’s 
liberty of contract jurisprudence was not the Warren Court’s 
liberalism but the indifference or hostility to the rights of 
African Americans shown by most Progressive legal elites (p. 
85). 
Still, Bernstein insists that “Buchanan’s implicit protection of 
[African-American] migration to urban areas, north and south, 
proved a crucial turning point in African American history”87 (p. 
83).  
This claim seems to me unproven, at least in Rehabilitating 
Lochner. Indeed, the structure of the sentence quoted above 
suggests that Bernstein himself may not consider the claim fully 
proven: the way he writes the sentence, what proved to be “a 
crucial turning point in African American history” was the 
implicit protection provided by Buchanan. It’s not clear how an 
implicit effect can confidently be stated as providing “a crucial 
turning point” in history. More generally (if still technically), as a 
historical matter the great migration of African-Americans to 
the north was already under way by 1917.88 If Buchanan had 
come out the other way would that phenomenon have reversed? 
Probably not, although it’s certainly plausible that it might have 
been mitigated, or that the arriving African-American pop-
ulations would have found themselves even more socially 
isolated than they ended up being. 
But a larger problem confronts Bernstein’s claim that 
Lochner, via Buchanan, hastened African-Americans’ full 
geographic and social integration into American life. This larger 
 
 87. See also Bernstein, Retrospective, supra note 10, at 1505–06 (Buchanan “allowed 
hundreds of thousands of African Americans to leave impoverished rural plantations for 
a better life in cities.”). 
 88. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 881, 897–98 (1998) (“Black migration northwards, which had appreciably 
increased in the 1890’s and 1900’s, exploded in 1916 owing to World War I.”); id. at 900. 
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problem in turn casts doubt on Lochner’s more general benefits 
for minorities. If Buchanan prevented cities from enacting laws 
like the Louisville segregation ordinance, then it must also be 
recognized that residential segregation continued unabated 
throughout the Lochner period. Northern cities were not 
suddenly integrated because of Buchanan. If the response to this 
observation is that that segregation arose from private choices 
rather than government action, the reply is that such private 
choices themselves would likely have been constitutionally 
protected by the same Lochner doctrine. Indeed, a case of a 
white seller refusing to sell to a black buyer in defiance of a non-
discrimination ordinance would feature the mirror image of the 
rights claim vindicated in Buchanan. More generally, restrictive 
covenants, famously struck down in Shelly v. Kraemer89 and 
Barrows v. Jackson,90 featured private party contracts that the 
Lochner Court presumably would have respected.91 
Concededly, the key issue in Shelley and Barrows was the 
Court’s conclusion that judicial enforcement of the covenant 
constituted state action—not, at least technically, a rejection of 
property owners’ claims that they had the right to contract to 
dispose of their property as they wished.92 Nevertheless, it is hard 
to believe that the Lochner Court, so committed to respecting a 
sphere of private freedom of action, would have adopted the 
same state action analysis as that of the very different, 
Roosevelt-dominated, Court in Shelley and Barrows. Indeed, 
Plessy v. Ferguson’s stubborn insistence that any badge of 
inferiority connoted by the Louisiana train segregation statute 
 
 89. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 90. 346 U.S. 249 (1953). 
 91. See Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 331 (1926) (suggesting the meritlessness 
of a claim that judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant by a District of 
Columbia court violated the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment); see also Klarman, supra. 
note 88, at 942 n.336 (noting state court decisions holding that such judicial enforcement 
did not constitute state action). 
 92. Of course, the Court’s broad understanding of state action in Shelley had the 
potential effect of converting private contractual decisions into state action. In this sense, 
Shelley’s state action analysis effectively restricted private parties’ contractual freedom 
by rendering that freedom subject to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, at 
least to the extent a contracting party sought a court’s aid in vindicating the terms of the 
contract.  
Commentators have noted the potentially broad effect of Shelley’s analysis on 
private parties’ freedom to contract as they wish. See, e.g., ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER 
MAY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 20–21 (5th ed. 2010); Martin Dolan, 
Comment, State Inaction and Section 1985(3): United Brotherhood of Carpenters and 
Joiners of America v. Scott, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1271, 1280–81 (1986). 
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flowed from African-Americans’ own perceptions, and not the 
state itself,93 suggests that the Lochner-era Court was not 
committed to a broad conception of state action.94 Thus, 
instances of private discrimination with regard to real estate 
transactions not only continued to exist after Buchanan, but 
presumably enjoyed constitutional protection based on the same 
freedom of contract doctrine that underlay Buchanan itself. 
If this analysis is correct, it follows that legislative action 
attacking such private discriminatory choices—not just in real 
estate, but more generally throughout the economy—would also 
be suspect under Lochner-style reasoning. In particular, 
employment non-discrimination and other similar laws likely 
would have been attacked during this era as inconsistent with 
Lochner’s presumptive protection for the rights of individuals to 
decide with whom they wished to deal.95 If a law prohibiting 
employers from demanding that would-be employees not join a 
union unconstitutionally violated both groups’ freedom of 
contract,96 then presumably a law requiring employers, shop-
 
 93. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896) (“We consider the underlying 
fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced 
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be 
so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race 
chooses to put that construction upon it.”). 
 94. It is true that the Court was willing to find state action in legislation that author-
ized political party action. See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (striking down, as 
state action violating the Fourteenth Amendment, a Texas law authorizing state political 
committees to set their own membership qualifications, as implemented by the state 
Democratic Party in a racially discriminatory way); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 
(1927) (invalidating a predecessor statute to the one struck down in Condon, which 
explicitly barred African-Americans from participating in a Democratic Party primary, 
but not discussing the state action issue). The Herndon statute’s explicit government 
discrimination makes it understandable why the state action issue was not explicitly 
discussed. It is worth noting that where that issue mattered, in Condon, the Four 
Horsemen dissented. See Condon, 286 U.S. at 90 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). 
 95. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 
384 (2003) (“Anti-discrimination laws did not exist during the Lochner era but would 
certainly be challenged as abridgments of freedom of contract today if Lochner 
survived.”); Klarman, supra note 88, at 939 n.323 (“The same substantive due process 
notions that invalidate residential segregation ordinances can be invoked to invalidate 
civil rights statutes on the ground that the state should not interfere with the contractual 
freedom of employers or owners of places of public accommodation.”). With regard to 
places of public accommodation it is at least possible that their common law foundation 
might save their constitutionality, to the extent that foundation implied a legitimate 
police power justification for them. See generally Joseph Singer, No Right To Exclude: 
Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283 (1996). 
 96. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (striking down state law prohibiting 
discharge of an employee for joining a union); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 
(1908) (striking down similar federal law).  
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keepers and real property owners not to discriminate would be 
similarly vulnerable, even in light of the fact that the Lochner 
Court upheld much social and economic regulation. It was only 
when the right to contract fell from favor that the due process 
argument against such laws became, if not frivolous, then at least 
a likely loser.97 
Second, as a practical matter it’s not clear what effect 
Lochner had on minorities. In Rehabilitating Lochner Bernstein 
cites only a state court case from Georgia, invalidating a law 
prohibiting black barbers from cutting white children’s hair, as 
an example of “liberty of contract reasoning” that was used in a 
way to further the interests of African-Americans98 (p. 85). To 
his credit, Bernstein recognizes that civil rights lawyers of the era 
did not have the resources to litigate such claims aggressively. 
He also suggests that groups such as the NAACP were not 
inclined to rely on liberty of contract reasoning, since “by the 
1920’s the NAACP’s leadership had an economically 
‘Progressive’ outlook, and was therefore hesitant to rely on 
‘conservative’ constitutional doctrines like liberty of contract” 
(p. 85). 
These observations betray more ambiguities with 
Bernstein’s thesis that, for minorities, the liberty of contract was, 
if not perfect, at least the best thing they had going.99 Most 
notably, if the lack of resources meant that civil rights groups 
were not able to enforce African-Americans’ contractual liberty 
rights then one can at least argue that a better strategy would 
have been for them to enlist the aid of government, via anti-
discrimination statutes. Of course, Bernstein is correct in his 
implicit suggestion that aggressive non-discrimination legislation 
was not forthcoming in the 1920’s.100 In that sense, there’s merit 
 
 97. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258–59 (1964) 
(rejecting a due process challenge to the public accommodations provisions of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 by applying a very deferential rational basis standard); id. at 275, 277 
(Black, J., concurring) (“In the past this Court has consistently held that regulation of the 
use of property by the Federal Government or the States does not violate either the Fifth 
or the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 98. Bernstein does cite one other case, dealing with ethnic Chinese merchants in 
the Philippines, where liberty of contract reasoning was used to assist an ethnic minority. 
(p. 85 n.93, citing Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 50 (1926) (invalidating a Philippines 
law requiring that business records be kept either in English or Spanish)). 
 99. Bernstein has developed this thesis in more detail elsewhere. See BERNSTEIN, 
ONLY ONE PLACE, supra note 21. 
 100. On the other hand, by the 1920’s some states had enacted public accom-
modations laws. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 95, at 1374 (noting that states started 
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in his claim that Lochner might have been the best tool 
minorities had. But again, to the extent that such legislation 
would have been threatened by exactly that same liberty of 
contract doctrine, it may be the case that had Lochner survived 
into the civil rights era it would have impeded African-
Americans’ civil rights legislative agenda.101 
This insight perhaps suggests why the NAACP leadership 
“was . . . hesitant to rely on ‘conservative’ constitutional doc-
trines like liberty of contract”102 (p. 85). Alternatively, perhaps 
that hesitancy was based more on the needs of a tactical alliance 
with anti-Lochner northern Progressives. But if this latter 
speculate is accurate, it starts to blur the clarity of Bernstein’s 
picture of a Progressive movement largely hostile to minorities.103 
In sum, either the NAACP leadership concluded that liberty of 
contract would ultimately redound to African-Americans’ 
detriment, or they calculated that an alliance with northern, anti-
Lochner, Progressives was more important than any marginal 
advantage they could win by relying on Lochner. Either 
possibility creates at least some tension with Bernstein’s overall 
narrative. 
These arguments by no means completely refute Bernstein’s 
claim that, given the available options, Lochner was the 
strongest tool minorities (and particularly African-Americans) 
possessed. Still, the vulnerability of anti-discrimination legisla-
tion to liberty of contract reasoning makes it plausible to 
conclude that equality advocates were ultimately correct to 
downplay reliance on Lochner. At the very least, the fact that 
the NAACP leadership—hardly unsophisticated advocates—
disdained that reasoning suggests that there must have been a 
good reason for them to believe that Lochner was not the right 
path to take. Indeed, the fact that Carolene Products ultimately 
 
enacting such laws in the immediate post-Civil War period).  
 101. In other writing Bernstein appears to agree with this assessment.  See 
BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE, supra note 21, at 113–14.  
 102. Similarly, at least some women’s rights groups during this era favored protective 
legislation for all workers, a position inconsistent with support for an extension of 
Lochner’s contractual liberty right to women. See, e.g., JULIE NOVKOV, CONSTITUTING 
WORKERS, PROTECTING WOMEN: GENDER, LAW AND LABOR IN THE PROGRESSIVE 
ERA AND NEW DEAL YEARS 187, 198 (2001) (cited in Bernstein, Feminist, supra note 10, 
at 1975). 
 103. In a footnote Bernstein does acknowledge that some pro-civil rights 
Progressives favored unions despite the latters’ racism, on the theory that unionization 
represented the best long-term hope for African-Americans’ economic prospects (p. 52 
n.108). 
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provided a formula for protecting African-Americans’ equality 
rights while simultaneously preserving government’s latitude to 
enact anti-discrimination laws that regulated marketplace 
choices ultimately confirms the correctness of their choice to 
reject Lochner. 
III. BACK TO THE FUTURE 
The above critiques notwithstanding, there is much merit in 
Bernstein’s suggestion that Lochner is the ultimate precursor to 
the modern substantive due process privacy cases. Indeed, 
Lochner, by opening the way for the Meyer line of cases, the 
cases protecting free speech, and the cases incorporating the 
criminal procedure provisions of the Bill of Rights, can be 
understood as (very) indirectly paving the way for footnote 
four’s reconceptualization of these cases as, respectively, cases 
protecting minorities, protecting the political process, and 
recognizing the legitimacy of judicial protection of textually-
based constitutional rights. 
The progression from robust judicial protection of 
unenumerated rights to a more nuanced recognition that some 
groups require special judicial protection from the legislative 
free-for-all is being replayed in the modern era. The modern 
privacy cases—most notably the abortion cases and Lawrence v. 
Texas104—have been subject to criticism that has never really 
abated since Roe. That criticism has led commentators 
sympathetic to those cases’ results to argue for a recasting of 
those rights as sounding in equality. This phenomenon has been 
most pronounced in the abortion context: ever since Roe, 
commentators sympathetic to the abortion right have argued 
that that right was better understood as flowing from the 
Constitution’s commitment to women’s equality.105 In the context 
of sexuality, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence argued 
that the Texas law banning same-sex sodomy was more 
 
 104. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 105. Most notably, before ascending to the Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
argued forcefully for understanding the abortion right as a right based in women’s 
equality. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in 
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985). She has continued to express this 
view on the Court, albeit within the limits of the current doctrine’s housing of the 
abortion right in substantive due process. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 
168, 184–85 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (using equality language to describe the 
importance of the abortion right). 
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appropriately struck down as a violation of equal protection, 
rather than as a violation of the majority’s loosely-defined right 
to private, consensual, non-commercial sexual conduct between 
adults.106 The current fight over same-sex marriage rights is 
replaying this debate, with some courts and commentators 
sympathetic to the rights claim arguing that it should inhere in 
equality guarantees rather than in an alleged “fundamental right 
to marriage.”107 
Thus, just as in the Lochner era, a substantive right 
recognized by courts has come under attack, and has generated 
calls, not for reversing the results of all the cases decided under 
that doctrine, but instead for their reconceptualization as 
equality cases. The same arguments made in favor of this change 
in the 1930’s are heard today. It is argued that judicial 
recognition of substantive rights is subjective, lacks a legitimate 
grounding in judicial competence, and amounts to judicial 
policymaking.108 On the other side of the ledger, advocates for an 
equality approach claimed during the Lochner era and claim 
today that such an approach respects legislative value choices 
and simply requires the legislature to provide to the disfavored 
group what it provides for the favored group.109 
 
 106. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–78 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 107. E.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); See also, e.g., Nelson 
Tebbe & Debra Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375 
(2010) (arguing that the best doctrinal vehicle for same-sex marriage rights is the funda-
mental rights strand of equal protection). 
 108. But see Carlos Ball, Why Liberty Judicial Review is as Legitimate as Equality 
Review: The Case of Gay Rights Jurisprudence, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2011) (arguing 
that equal protection review is no more cabined or objective than due process review); 
Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011) (describing a 
new, dignity-based, approach to rights protection). 
 109. See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. City of New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111, 112–13 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not 
forget today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and 
unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials would 
impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door 
to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few 
to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might 
be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better measure 
to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in operation.”); Cruzan 
v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292, 300 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Are there, 
then, no reasonable and humane limits that ought not to be exceeded in requiring an 
individual to preserve his own life? There obviously are, but they are not set forth in the 
Due Process Clause. What assures us that those limits will not be exceeded is the same 
constitutional guarantee that is the source of most of our protection—what protects us, 
for example, from being assessed a tax of 100% of our income above the subsistence 
level, from being forbidden to drive cars, or from being required to send our children to 
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It remains to be seen how such calls for an equality 
approach will be resolved. We are a long way from 1938, when 
the Court could confidently presume that it had the competence 
to determine when “prejudice against discrete and insular 
minorities” really existed, and thus justified more searching 
judicial review.110 But the larger point remains: what Lochner 
teaches us is that a judicial doctrine can generate progeny that 
morph into new doctrines, once the results under the original 
doctrine are better understood with the passage of time. 
At least this is one way a student could answer the opening 
question.111 
 
school for 10 hours a day, none of which horribles are categorically prohibited by the 
Constitution. Our salvation is the Equal Protection Clause, which requires the 
democratic majority to accept for themselves and their loved ones what they impose on 
you and me.”).  
 110. See, e.g., William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power and the Rational Basis 
Standard of Equal Protection, 79 TULANE L. REV. 519, 521–23 (2005) (noting the Court’s 
inconsistent and unsteady application of footnote four’s formula); see also Bruce 
Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985) (critiquing the 
usefulness of footnote fours’s “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” 
formula). 
 111. See text accompanying supra notes 3–4. 
